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Abstract
The rise of digital platforms has transformative implications for strategies of financ-
ing media production and for exploitation of the economic value in creative content. 
In the television industry, changes in technologies for distribution and the emergence 
of SVOD services such as Netflix are gradually shifting audiences and financial power 
away from broadcasters while at the same time creating unprecedented opportunities 
for programme-makers.  Drawing on findings from recent RCUK-funded research, this 
article examines how these shifts are affecting production financing and the economics 
of supplying television content.  In particular, it focuses on how changes in the dynam-
ics of rights markets and in strategic approaches towards the financing of television 
production might mean for markets, industries and for policies intended to support 
the economic sustainability of independent television content production businesses. 
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Resumen 
El creciente aumento de las plataformas digitales está transformando las estrategias 
de financiación de los medios de comunicación para la producción y la explotación del 
valor económico de los contenidos creativos. En la industria de la televisión, los cambios 
que se han producido en las tecnologías de distribución y la aparición de servicios VOD 
(video bajo demanda) como Netflix están cambiando gradualmente tanto al público 
como el poder financiero de los radiodifusores, al tiempo que está generando oportuni-
dades sin precedentes para los realizadores de programas. A partir de los resultados de 
un reciente investigación financiada por la RCUK (Research Councils UK), este artículo 
examina cómo estos cambios están afectando a la financiación de la producción de con-
tenidos para televisión. En particular se centra en evaluar los cambios en las dinámicas 
de los mercados de derechos así como los nuevos enfoques estratégicos para la financia-
ción de la producción de la televisión con el fin de comprender el valor que tienen para 
los mercados, las industrias y las políticas destinadas a apoyar la sostenibilidad econó-
mica de las empresas de producción de contenidos televisivos independientes.
Palabras clave: Producción de televisión - Plataformas digitales - VOD - Industria 
de la televisión - Modelos de financiación
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1. Introduction
Television is an important industry and, on account of its significance as a 
medium of communication and popular entertainment and as a component of the 
creative economy, is often the subject of public policy interventions and special 
support measures. The UK television industry generates annual revenues in excess 
of £13bn (Ofcom, 2015b: 143) and programme-making or production represents a 
vital sector within this.  Helped by steady growth in international sales, revenues 
to the UK production sector from exploitation of content rights have been on a 
rising trend for the last two decades and doubled between 2009 and 2014 (Oliver 
& Ohlbaum, 2015: 54). 
However, in recent years digitisation and growth of the internet have altered 
modes of distribution and consumption of television with potentially transfor-
mative implications for television programe-making businesses (Steemers, 2014). 
The emergence of digital subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) services such as 
Netflix is gradually shifting audiences and financial power away from broadcasters 
and, while creating unprecedented opportunities for programme-makers, is also 
altering the windowing strategies used to squeeze value from intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) in television content (Doyle, 2016).  Drawing on findings from recent 
RCUK-funded research, this article provides a preliminary analysis of how these 
shifts may pose a threat to predominant models of production financing, rights 
ownership and the economics of supplying television content.  The question it 
addresses is to what extent do changes in the dynamics of rights markets ushered 
in by the rise of multi-territory SVOD services raise concern about the ability of 
production companies to retain ownership of IPRs and maximize the value of their 
content assets? 
Economics of Content Supply
Making television is generally both an expensive and a risky business (Caves, 
2000; De Vany, 2004) . Production of professionally-crafted content is characteri-
zed by high first copy costs (Hoskins, McFadyen & Finn, 2004). However, once a 
programme has been created then it costs relatively little to reproduce and supply 
it to extra consumers.  Like other so-called ‘information’ goods, television content 
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has public good characteristics insofar as the act of consumption by one individual 
does not reduce its supply to others (Withers 2006: 5).  Replication costs tend to 
be low as the same content can be re-used again and again with little additional 
expense. 
This makes it attractive to try and extend consumption of finished programmes 
to as many paying audiences as possible across platforms and across international 
territories (Chalaby, 2012).  Selling programmes across national frontiers may well 
involve some marginal outlays in marketing and distribution (e.g., costs of atten-
dance at international television fairs and markets). In territories that have their 
own distinctive languages, dubbing or sub-titling may impose some marginal costs, 
although how these are shared between rights owners and distributors varies. Even 
so, because of the public good attributes of audiovisual content, content suppliers 
stand to benefit from the widespread availability of economies of scale and scope 
(Doyle 2014). The wider the audience, the more profitable content will become. 
But, as consumption of each individual television programme expands, an impor-
tant question is who exactly will reap the benefit?  How are the rewards that stem 
from reducing per-capita production costs apportioned between the producer of 
content, the distributor, and the broadcaster or other service packager?   A central 
concern in this article is to examine how existing patterns of apportionment of 
rewards may be disrupted as multi-territory digital services become increasingly 
important purchasers of original new television content.
The high initial costs involved in production make it imperative for content ow-
ners to deploy effective so-called ’windowing’ strategies to maximise the value of 
their wares.   Windowing describes a process in which content is released in a care-
fully planned sequential order across a number of distributive outlets (August, Dao 
and Shin, 2012; Shay, 2015; Ulin, 2014).  It is about arranging the release sequen-
ce for content to differing portions of the audience in such a way as maximises 
overall returns.  Windowing is often most closely associated with feature film but 
owners of rights for television content must also adopt strategies of dividing the 
whiole potential market into segments and of then releasing content to differing 
portions of the audience at different times, using delays where possible to build 
demand but more fundamentally as a means of squeezing the maximum value from 
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IPR assets (Christophers, 2012).   Global audiences are segmented by platform and 
territory, and then content is rolled out across domestic and international markets 
through a series of sequential ‘windows’.
The work of Steve Wildman and Bruce Owen was seminal in modelling this pro-
cess (Owen and Wildman, 1992). These media economists identified a number of 
factors that theoretically determine the best sequence for releasing content via 
differing windows or channels.  The starting point is systematic analysis of factors 
such as the size and per-viewer profit margins of differing windows, the perisha-
bility of the content, the time value of money and, not least, piracy.   Many of 
the factors identified by Owen and Wildman remain relevant some 25 years later. 
However the landscape for distribution of television content has been transformed, 
in particular by the rapid growth of ‘over the top’ provision – content distributed 
via the internet (Álvarez Monzoncillo, 2011;  Sherman and Waterman, 2015).
Rights, Asymmetry in Bargaining Power and Policy Interventions   
It is no accident that windowing strategies for television content were first 
theorized in the context of the US. The television industry in the US has histori-
cally tended to be much more commercially developed than in Europe or elsewhere 
(Lotz, 2007).  Helped along by advantages of scale, wealth and language in their 
home market, US producers have long experience of and success in honing their 
strategies for maximising returns from IPRs in both domestic and international 
markets (Doyle, 2014; Owen and Wildman, 1992; Ulin 2014).   By contrast, Europe’s 
television industries with their strong traditions of public service and monolithic 
state broadcasting institutions, up until as recently as the early 1980s were prone 
to regarding the production of content not so much as an economic activity in its 
own right but rather as an adjunct to the task of broadcasting.   However, from 
the mid-1980s onwards, a growing recognition of the potential value of having a 
competitive and economically robust programme production sector was to bring 
about change.   
In the UK, a series of key policy interventions brought about the arrival and 
early development of a fledgling ‘independent’ television production sector – i.e. 
one in which programme-makers are not cross-owned by broadcasters (or vice versa) 
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(Doyle and Paterson, 2008). A political impetus on the part of the UK Government 
to support the interests of independent producers partly reflects the historically 
strong and well-organised lobbying efforts of this particular sector over many 
years.   A similar commitment to fostering a programme-making sector which is 
separate from broadcasting is discernible at European level and is evidenced, for 
example, by the continued enshrinement in European legislation of a 10 percent 
compulsory quota on broadcast channels for independent television productions 
(Broughton Micova, 2013).  
The position of the UK independent production sector was bolstered from the 
early 1980s onwards through a variety of policy measures (Darlow, 2004; Chalaby, 
2010). Initially, the emphasis of policy interventions was on countering the stren-
gth of vertically integrated broadcasters (who historically had tended to make a 
majority of their own programmes in-house) and on boosting levels of demand 
for the output of newly emergent ‘indies’.  UK Government intervention was suc-
cessful in encouraged the development of a large number of independent producers 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Doyle and Paterson, 2008).   However, a proli-
feration of competing programme suppliers brought one unwelcome side effect: 
asymmetry in bargaining power.   Programme supply is a market place characte-
rized by high levels of buyer concentration.   The resulting problem for most UK 
producers (aside from a small handful with well established reputations) of limited 
leverage when dealing with broadcasters meant, in turn, a lack of opportunity to 
participate in the rewards that any ‘hit’ television product might generate.  
From around 2000 onwards, it was recognised that many independent producers 
suffered from a lack of bargaining strength in their negotiations with commis-
sioning broadcasters and so the focus of public intervention shifted away from 
promoting market entry and onto the need to secure improved terms of trade for 
programme-makers (Ofcom, 2006; Doyle and Paterson, 2008).  Intervention via the 
Communications Act 2003 sought to tackle this situation by requiring UK public 
sector broadcasting (PSB) organisations to offer deals to producers where primary 
transmission rights may be unbundled and priced separately from the additional 
rights with a greater proportion or the latter left in the hands of producers (Oliver 
and Ohlbaum, 2011).   UK regulator Ofcom is obliged to ensure that PSB channels 
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draw up and adhere to suitable and transparent frameworks when agreeing terms 
for the commissioning of independent productions.  
This intervention made a substantial positive difference to the business perfor-
mance of UK independent producers and is credited with enabling many to turn 
‘from minnows into sharks’ (Saini, 2005).  It paved the way for the development of 
many larger sized independents or ‘super indies’ who, on account of their scale and 
successful track records, have managed to achieve considerable status and finan-
cial success  (Digital-i, 2008; Ofcom, 2015b: 12).  As Figure 1 below indicates, the 
UK independent production sector has almost doubled its revenues over the last 
decade (Oliver & Ohlbaum, 2015: 7) and a growing proportion of revenues in the 
sector are accounted for by larger sized companies (Ofcom, 2015b: 38-9).  
Figure 1: UK Independent Television Production Sector Revenues, 2004-2015
Thus, intervention on the part of the UK Government has proven effective in sup-
porting the development of what is now recognised to be, comparatively speaking, 
a commercially thriving indigenous television production sector in the UK (Digital-i, 
2008; Oliver & Ohlbaum, 2015).  The instigation of improved terms of trade agree-
ments between commissioning television broadcasters and producers played a key 
role in promoting a more favourable business performance by the sector (McVay, 
2014).  Many production companies began to achieve commercial success and to 
merge with one another ‘once interventions were put in place in 2003 that allowed 
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production companies to own and exploit their own intellectual property’ (Ofcom, 
2015b:12).   However changes in the dynamics of rights markets suggest that this 
approach which, for many UK production companies, has served well in building 
up their businesses over time, is now of limited compatability with the emerging 
requirements of multi-territory service providors as purchasers of television content.
Drawing on an original empirical investigation of the experience of leading 
UK-based international television producers and distributors, this article provides 
a preliminary analysis of how television producers are responding to the rise of 
multi-territory digital services as purchasers of new content and how new cultures 
of production funding are affecting rights ownership and the ability of producers 
to fully exploit the economic value in their own content.  Findings presented stem 
from an original empirical investigation funded by the UK Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AH/K000179/1).   Methods of research involved a case study 
based investigation of leading UK-based television production and distribution 
companies.   Interviews were carried out with senior executives at companies 
including Endemol-Shine, Sony Pictures Television International, Lookout Point, 
KEO Films, Zodiak Rights, Warner Brothers International Television Production, ITV 
and BBC Worldwide in 2014-15.    Interviewees included distribution specialists 
with frontline responsibility for developing and enacting windowing strategies and 
Chief Creative Officers with responsibility for production decisions.   
In the sections that follow, this article firstly explains the production funding 
models that have predominated to date; secondly presents findings on how, on ac-
count of the rise of SVOD services, windowing strategies and the dynamics of rights 
markets are undergoing transformation; and thirdly it assesses how attendant 
changes in approaches to production funding raise potential for concern about the 
ability of production companies to retain ownership of intellectual property rights 
and maximize the value of their content assets and businesses in future.
2. Television production funding models
Commissioning terms vary from one individual production to the next and can be 
very complex but, broadly speaking, the sort of deal on offer to television producers 
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who are commissioned to make original content will frequently conform with one or 
other of two basic sorts of models.  The first of these called deficit financing and is 
common practice in the US (Litman, 1998) and now followed in the UK too.  What it 
means is that, in return for the right to transmit a finished programme, the commis-
sioner of that content – typically, a major broadcaster - will systematically offer the 
producer a fee which is less than the production budget for that programme, say by 
one-third.  The ensuing difference or ‘deficit’ has to be made up by programme-maker. 
But in return, it is the programme-maker – as opposed to the commissioning televi-
sion service provider – who retains the potentially lucrative secondary rights, i.e. the 
ability, following initial transmissions, to sell that content property onwards again to 
additional domestic broadcasters, video on demand services, online retailers such as 
iTunes, DVD distributors, overseas broadcasters, etc.  Deficit financing promotes risk-
sharing between the broadcaster and the producer with potential benefits for each 
party in that ‘the broadcaster pays less than it would otherwise have done, while the 
producer can gain the upside from selling secondary rights’ (Ofcom, 2015b: 17). 
The main alternative model – one which is prevalent across Europe and which 
was dominant in the UK prior to 2003 - is called cost plus.  Under this approach, 
broadcasters or other television services  services who commission new programmes 
from producers will generally pay the full production costs plus a small production 
fee or ‘profit’ up-front to the producer (Doyle and Paterson 2008).  In return, the 
broadcaster generally acquires not only the first window transmission rights but 
also, by and large, all additional secondary rights (e.g. DVD, overseas sales, digital 
catch-up, online etc).   For independent production companies, many of which are 
small and under-capitalised, the absence of any requirement for financial input or 
risk sharing may be welcome.  However, there is a residual value in many or most 
programmes beyond their first transmission; the right to sell a programme to an 
additional audience is a potential additional source of revenue which could stretch 
out over several years (Chalaby, 2012; Owen and Wildman, 1992).
So the differing cultures and models of financing - the differing terms on which 
original productions are commissioned - can have very significant implications for 
the business performance and economic viability of firms engaged in production 
and supply of television content.
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3. Windowing
For production companies who retain ownership and control of the intellectual pro-
perty attached to their television shows, effective exploitation of these assets is depen-
dent on strategies of windowing.   But, on account of the growth of digital distribution 
platforms and of the internet in recent years, devising and enacting a suitable windowing 
strategy has become much more challenging (Christophers, 2012; Napoli, 2011; Ulin 
2014).   From a producers’ perspective, the arrival and growth of digital platforms has 
stimulated welcome growth in the number of windows available and has introduced more 
competition between potential purchasers of content.   Whereas, back in the 1990s, the 
main windows available for example in the UK were, typically, the primary and secondary 
domestic broadcast channels plus interantional markets (often with the initial rights 
being assigned to a domestic commissioning broadcaster and with international rollout 
following later), a major difference in 2016 is the presence of many online distribution 
windows for TV content, such as online catch-up, advertiser based (AVOD) and subscrip-
tion funded (SVOD) services, and online retail services (TVOD).  
BBC Worldwide – the distribution arm of the BBC - is one of the largest intena-
tional suppliers of television content in the world. The Chief Content Office of BBC 
Worldwide confirms that the development of digital distribution has had a marked 
impact on windowing strategies over the last 10-20 years: 
The over the top players have had a huge impact. [But] first of all the big change 
has been the proliferation of channels - an enormous number of pay TV and cable 
and satellite channels and digital channels that are in the marketplace now …and so 
that in itself leads to more windowing.  It’s not necessarily straightforward as to what 
the [ideal release] sequence is for television. Sometimes it will be pay first, followed 
by terrestrial, and then into basic.  Or it could be the reverse: it is often terrestrial 
first followed by secondary cable.  It depends on each individual market landscape 
… [and] if you’ve got a niche service… Another big change over the last few years is 
speed to market … nobody is prepared to wait and obviously piracy on the internet is 
an issue... for really big brands that passionate fans would do anything to get to see. 
(CCO, BBCW, Interview, London: March 2015)
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While extra distribution avenues have opened up new revenue streams to pro-
ducers, at the same time they have made it much more difficult to organize the 
planned roll-out of content across differing windows into a pattern that builds 
avoids overlaps and potential cannibalisation of revenues and that yields the hig-
hest return (Doyle, 2016).  In addition to promoting market growth, new digital 
windows have precipitated a substitution effect as processes of audience fragmen-
tation have fractured returns and made it increasingly difficult for programme 
suppliers to capture large audiences and launch new programme brands in the 
digital era (ibid). According to one senior distribution executive:
what is interesting is that these opportunities tend to start off as a sort of a 
nice bit of additional revenue and over time you get to a world where rather 
than it being ‘and’ it’s ‘or’.  I think that is the challenge that everyone faces.
(Distribution Executive, Zodiak International, Interview, London: March 2015)
At the same time as new avenues have brought opportunity, they have also 
made it more challenging to extract value from content assets using the approa-
ches to windowing of the past (Kuhr, 2008; Napoli, 2011). Traditional approaches 
to windowing rely on being able to partition audiences into discrete segments 
and then control the release of content across those differing segments.  Whereas 
that was relatively straightforward in the pre-internet period, now some of the 
segments have become somewhat or very porous. Online video-on-demand services 
(catch-up etc) typically require extended temporal access to content, and subs-
cription video-on-demand (SVOD) services usually entail a multi-territory foot-
print.   Evidence gathered from a range of production and distribution executives 
involved in planning and executing windowing strategies confirms that, as market 
delineations become more porous, this has made it much more difficult to she-
pherd content through in a neat sequential series of releases (Doyle, 2016).  
Earlier research has drawn attention to the changes wrought by the growing 
market presence of OTT services such as Netflix in the UK, Spain and beyond (Stee-
mers, 2014; Pérez-Latre, Sánchez-Tabernero and García Mansilla, 2016; Urgellés, 
Herrero and Medina, 2016).  Increased competition between broadcasters, pay-TV 
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operators and SVOD services has had a marked influence on patterns of demand for 
content.  One of the major corollaries of the rise of SVODs and of existing Pay-TV 
operators seeking to defend their market positions has been increased investment 
in ‘big statement’ programmes, especially drama (Doyle, 2016).  In the words of 
one television executive: 
Netflix and Amazon are having a huge impact.  Even if what they actually 
commit to is not that huge, in terms of volume of shows, the PR impact and 
the kind of eye-watering financial numbers that are involved leaves everyone 
else dwarfed. If they want something they will go very big.  So the impact in 
people’s minds is much greater …They are changing everything, partly because 
of the way [they] will often release a whole series all in one day… They are also 
incredibly focussed on a small number of genres… [especially] high end, high 
budget, big impact, highly marketable [drama].
(CCO, BBCW, Interview, London: March 2015)
An emphasis on drama which generally is expensive to produce has in turn ne-
cessitated much greater emphasis on drawing in international sources of support 
whether through tax supports or partnerships (Chalaby 2012; Steemers, 2014; 
Doyle, 2016).   At a time of concern about the viability of national content pro-
duction industries (Hartley, 2004; Hesmondhalgh, 2012), the ways that interna-
tionalisation of funding is affecting production decisions is an issue that deserves 
further research and analysis.
It is also evident that, fuelled by the growth of multi-territory broadcast plat-
forms and channels such as Sky and Discovery but also driven by SVOD services 
such as Netflix and Amazon Prime, the terms on which content is commissioned 
from producers are changing. When globalised pay-TV or online subscription VOD 
services such as Netflix buy new content, they typically want exclusive rights 
across multiple territories and over time.  Such requirements potentially have 
disruptive implications for windowing strategies, as explained by one creative and 
sales executive:  
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In the past distribution and rights businesses were built on rights to a territory 
and particular segments of rights for that territory and particular windows… 
Now the Netflix’s are going “Right let’s just scrap the territory model”…Multi-
territory global buyers are completely changing the landscape … It reduces 
potential revenues.  It makes it a lot more difficult because a buyer will now 
say “Well, you are making it for me in country X but I want to use this in coun-
tries Y and Z.”  You will find some way of making them pay something for that 
but very rarely will it be what you would have got if you had taken it to them 
directly after the event and it will be certainly a lot less than what you would 
have got if you had been able to generate competition for the rights to the 
particular product created.   So it is bad news.
(CCO,WBITV, Interview, London: April 2015)
Most UK production companies are keenly aware of the contrast between the 
terms on offer from an SVOD service versus those on offer from UK PSB organisa-
tions (which, since 2004, have been subject to regulatory oversight).  Yet there 
remains considerable optimism surrounding the development SVOD services.  Is 
such enthusiasm consistent with longer-term ambitions to develop sustainable 
content production businesses?
4. A return to cost plus? 
It is easy to see why television producers might look favourably on opportuni-
ties to sell their back catalogues to Netflix, Amazon Prime and other new online 
content services.  Evidence gathered from leading UK independent producers and 
distributors suggests that most tend to welcome the growing market presence of 
SVODs as extra windows through which library content can gain incremental paid 
exposure to audiences.    
In addition, the growing presence of Netflix, Amazon and others as potential 
purchasers of first-run originated content is seen by most producers as a welco-
me development.   One independent producer acknowledges that, although the 
commissioning terms on offer from SVODs do not offer the protections related to 
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ownership of secondary rights that UK producers currently enjoy under domestic 
PSB commissioning models, imparting exclusive rights over a lengthy period of 
time may nonetheless be attractive on account of high fees:
The way we view Netflix, we would love to produce something directly for 
them… you know they are going to want worldwide rights probably for a sig-
nificant amount of time if not forever. And whilst we are lucky enough not to 
have that model with the UK broadcasters, we are prepared to accept it on some 
other platforms. The quid pro quo is that [SVODs] tend to pay the full cost of 
production plus a decent margin. So you know that you’re going to be making 
money off the original commission.
(CEO, KEO Films, Interview, London: March 2015).
The willingness of SVOD services to pay high prices for content that is seen as 
desirable is clearly a major source of appeal.  One executive in charge of creative 
development of international productions explains the comparative advantages of 
achieving a commission from Netflix thus:
We have recently got the biggest drama commission in British television his-
tory which is a show called The Crown.  It is going to be a very, very expensive 
show…Originally our intention was that we would make it for a British broad-
caster and we would look for American co-production money - the traditional 
model... [But] then Netflix came in and said we want all rights so we will fund 
this and we will fund it at a level that is unimaginably high.   Because clearly 
they see it strategically …The British monarchy is one of those brands it is qui-
te easy to sell. They can market it. It will be top quality.  For them it is worth 
the premium.
(Chief Creative Officer, SPTV, Interview, London: April 2015)
The fact that SVODs are prepared to pay ‘unimaginably high’ fees for appea-
ling content is a welcome proposition for most producers and many welcome the 
prospect of access to audiences on a global scale.  More generally, enthusiasm for 
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what one producer describes as additional ‘customers in the marketplace’ reflects 
recognition of the potential for SVODs to help counteract power structures in the 
television industry which, historically, have been dominated by broadcasters.   
While the introduction of terms of trade in the UK back in 2004 has functioned 
well as a corrective to lack of bargaining leverage for producers, a decade later 
buyer concentration still remains an issue.  Acoording to recent data, ‘[i]n 2014, 
the PSBs remained the largest buyers of UK TV programmes, still accounting for 
around 85% of all UK non-sport new TV programme investment, a figure that has 
remained broadly flat over the past five years’ (Oliver & Ohlbaum data cited in 
Ofcom, 2015b: 14-15).  So even though, in the words of one distribution execu-
tive, ‘Netflix won’t want everything and won’t pay the big fees for everything’ 
(Endemol-Shine International, Interview, March 2015), the presence of SVODs as 
extra competitors in the domain of content commissioning promises to help shift 
power dynamics in the television industry in ways that are favourable to content 
suppliers.  
However broadcasters still retain considerable market power and are unlikely 
to be deposed quickly and easily.  According to one highly experienced practitio-
ner of windowing strategies, an important consideration for any producer who at 
the moment is considering selling first window rights to SVODs – quite aside from 
issues of retention of ownership of secondary rights – is whether broadcasters 
will in any case be interested in purchasing that programme afterwards:
The big unknown for anybody at the moment is whether, if you licence a 
brand first windowed to one of those big label players and they take those 
rights for a few years or if you do an original with those players or a presale 
or whatever, what we don’t yet know is will broadcasters touch those brands 
afterwards?  Logic would say that they would. But there is a lot of pressure 
from traditional broadcasters in the market that says ”well, if you do that 
then don’t assume that we are going to take the programmes later”.  
(Distribution Executive, Interview, London: March 2015)
Clearly then, conducting transactions with SVODs involves risks, not least 
related to curtailment of opportunities to exploit the residual value in content 
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assets.  It is widely acknowledged that sale of first window rights to an SVOD ser-
vice is apt to reduce the opportunities available to content suppliers to exploit 
any residual value in their intellectual property assets in subsequent release win-
dows.   An additional drawback is that SVODs are reluctant to share data about 
their audiences which adds to the difficulty producers face in trying to plan 
optimal widowing strategies.  Whether, on balance, the sort of commissioning 
terms on offer from SVODs are advantageous or not depends on circumstances.  
According to a leading UK independent production and distribution company:
This is the big question really at the moment in the industry – if you are 
creating programming for these big SVOD platforms, are you doing it in a way 
where those platforms end up owning the entire content?
(COO, Lookout Point, Interview, London: March 2015)
One distribution executive provides a salutary reminder that, rather than prio-
ritising control over rights per se, the business of supplying television content is 
dependent on maximising revenues from licencing:
I always say all rights are available if you’ve got the money to pay for them.  
Because otherwise what is the model?  Our model as a producer is not that we 
work to create IP but that we licence it.  We licence out.  We control produc-
tion and we also are the distributor and we share the rights with those we 
have to.
(CEO, Endemol-Shine International, London: March 2015)
However, at a time when industry power dynamics are in transition, making 
judgements about whom to share rights with and on what terms can prove cha-
llenging. The correct windowing strategy for any programme of course always 
depends  on the specific features of that content and market context (ibid).  But 
more widely the possibility of engaging in deals with SVODs such as Netflix on a 
cost plus basis entails both potential advantages and disadvantages. 
High fees from one outlet may result in a greater overall return for the produ-
cer than the alternative strategy of selling that same content across a protracted 
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series of windows. Selling all rights to one outlet may save on transaction costs 
which, as earlier research has shown (Deakin and Pratten, 2000), are a recogni-
sed feature in the television industry.  The certainty of a high upfront fee that 
is both immediate and guaranteed may well be appealing, especially for smaller 
producers.  On the other hand, licencing new content to SVODs entails potential 
opportunity costs in terms of building brand visibility with domestic audiences 
since, despite changing television consumption habits, SVODs generally attract 
much lower audiences than popular mainstream broadcast channels  (Ofcom, 
2015a).   More fundamentally, the allure of cost plus deals is greatly tainted by 
awareness amongst producers of how effective policy interventions that discou-
raged such deals have been in helping UK production businesses build up their 
intellectual property catalogues and raise the capital and investment needed to 
achieve expansion and international success over recent years.   
Conclusions
Recent work in cultural economics and in cultural sociology has questioned the 
links between the incentives towards making creative output and the protections 
provided by copyright law to monopolise returns from creative output (Schlesinger 
and Waelde, 2012; Towse, 2004). Based on evidence concerning the experience of 
the UK televison production sector, this article argues that there are compelling 
links between rights ownership and opportunities to build commercially successful 
content creation businesses. 
The production sector in the UK has thrived over the last decade and, as eviden-
ced by strong growth in international sales of programmes and programme formats, 
UK producers have build an enviable reputation of leadership in global markets for 
intellectual property rights in television content (Ofcom, 2015b). Amongst indus-
try analysts, a strong consensus exists that a key enabler of this success has been:
…the ability under terms of trade of independent producers to own programme 
IP in the long term, with rights reverting to production companies after initial 
primary licence, catch-up and returning series ‘hold back’ periods. This asset 
ownership led directly to an inflow of capital to the sector post 2004, providing 
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UK companies with the means to expand internationally and cement a position 
for the UK as a global hub for television IP trade.
(Oliver & Ohlbaum, 2011: 2)
For those television companies who have managed to achieve significant com-
mercial success, retention of copyright ownership and systematic exploitation 
of rights have been key features.   Ownership of rights and of an asset base are 
pivotal to raising capital, securing investment and fostering businesses that are 
truly sustainable over the longer term.  However, as the findings presented in 
this paper suggest, the rise of SVODs and other transnational television services 
with requirements for content on a multi-territory and extended temporal basis 
now raises questions about the ability of content producers to operate business 
models that are reliant on full ownership and exploitation of secondary rights.
Whilst a determination to retain ownership of secondary rights for their own 
sake makes little sense, the lessons provided by the history of the UK production 
sector suggest that programme-makers must be circumspect about being lured by 
big fees into a cost plus model of production financing in which the outlet that 
is commissioning the content expects to take ownership of almost all the rights.   
The problem with this approach is that it cuts across the ability of production 
companies to build up their catalogues of revenue-generating intellectual proper-
ty assets and to use windowing strategies to build their businesses.  As one lea-
ding producer put it: “Windows become a bit less important there when you are 
just dealing with one client who wants to own the world.” (COO, Lookout Point, 
Interview, London: March 2015)
The importance of ownership of rights is inescapable and this applies not only 
to individual companies but to the television production sector as a whole.  The 
connection between, on the one hand, ownership of rights and, on the other, com-
mercial and creative success is powerfully made by one senior television executive:
The thing that makes Britain such a vibrant creative hub is the fact that the 
producers own the rights and so that means that it breeds, in simplistic terms, 
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a hunger - a commercial hunger - that then in turn breeds creative competi-
tion which is healthy and good and allows Britain export internationally.
(Business Manager, BBCW, Interview, London: March 2015)
Thus, the performance of the UK’s sector over the last decade offers a poten-
tially valuable lesson for other European countries, Spain included, who still 
adhere to cost plus rather than deficit financing models of production funding. 
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